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Fictional  scientific  models  include  falsehoods  that  are  not  captured  under  the 
categories of simplification, approximation, or idealization. Recent commentators have 
found it  puzzling  that  these  literally  false  models  are  still  capable,  in  some cases  of  
furnishing scientific explanations. In this paper, I spell  out a paradox that arises from 
accepting the explanatory capacity of fictional scientific models and provide a way of 
understanding these models that resolves the paradox. My proposed solution is that we 
should understand fictional scientific models as a type of paraphrasable metaphor. I apply 
my solution to three case studies and conclude on the basis of its successful application 
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Recently, philosophers of science have devoted considerable attention to 
the  presence  of  fictions  in  scientific  modeling.1 Some  philosophers  have 
suggested that there are instances in which the explanatory capacity of models 
with  fictional  elements  is  not  diminished  by  the  presence  of  these  fictional 
elements.2 Often, these discussions focus on questions of whether one can both 
accept  fictional  models  as explanatory and be a scientific  realist.3 For present 
purposes, I will assume the truth of scientific realism.4 Moreover, though there is 
reasonable debate to be had on this point, I will take for granted in this paper that 
models can provide scientific explanations. I propose to answer the question: How 
can  it  be  that  a  fictional  scientific  model  furnishes  a  genuine  scientific 
explanation? 
In Part I, I will first demarcate the class of cases that interest me (I.1). For 
comparison's sake, I will consider some examples of models that admit of some 
1 See for  instance  Bukolich (2009,  2011,  2012 ),  Frigg (2010a, 2010b),  Giere (2009),  Levy 
(2012), Toon (2010), and Winsberg (2009).
2 See for instance Bukolich (2012) and Winsberg (2009). 
3 For a helpful overview of the purported tension between fictions and realism, see Levy (2012). 
4 I take it that the success of my account does not depend on the truth of realism. However, the 
challenge of accounting for how fictional models can be explanatory is greater within a realist 
framework, so I will seek to answer this greater challenge. It would, presumably, be easier  
within an anti-realist framework to account for the phenomenon of explanatory fictions, both 
because anti-realists tend not to consider explanation to be of great importance in scientific 
practice and because anti-realists do not take science to regard its theories about unobservables 
as true. 
familiar types of falsehoods without exhibiting the more radical falsehoods that qualify 
models as fictional in the sense that interests me (I.2). I will then present three cases of 
fictional models and draw out some common features (I.3). In Part II, I will present a 
paradox that arises from considering these fictional models to be explanatory (II.2). I will 
then  consider  one  recent  proposal  –  from  Alisa  Bokulich  –  that  would  resolve  the 
paradox, but at  what I take to be too great a cost (II.3). I will  then provide my own 
account of how fictional models function (II.4) and show how it resolves the paradox 
(II.5). In brief, I will say that we should interpret models with fictional elements as a 
class  of  metaphors,  and  that  doing  so  will  show  that  no  genuine  paradox  arises 
concerning the explanatory capacity of these fictional models. Finally, I will show that 
my analysis applies seamlessly to the three cases I considered in I.3 (II.6).
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Chapter I: Identifying Explanatory Fictional Models
1. What are fictional models?
Despite the considerable attention that has been paid to the role of fictions 
in  scientific  modeling,  there  is  no  widespread  consensus  about  the  precise 
definition of a fictional model. Thus, it is first necessary for me to stipulate the 
class of cases to which I will apply the term. While I think my account lines up 
with most of the cases that philosophers have labeled fictional, it may exclude 
some models others categorize as fictional and may include some models other 
categorize as non-fictional.  To delineate the models I  consider fictional,  I  will 
now present two criteria. If a model meets either criterion, it  is  not a fictional 
model  on  my  account.  Models  that  fail  to  meet  both  criteria,  but  appear 
nonetheless to provide or feature in good scientific explanations, are the fictional 
models I will examine. 
A. Fictions contain falsehoods that are not limited to simplifications, 
approximations, and idealizations.
In a trivial sense, all models are false in some ways. For instance, they 
necessarily  leave  out  some  details  of  their  target  systems,  the  scientific 
phenomena the models seek to represent. All models feature simplifications, and 
many  feature  idealizations,  and  approximations  as  well.  By  simplifications,  I 
mean omissions of some details of target systems that are irrelevant to the purposes for 
which individual models are devised. For example, a model of the human circulatory 
system devised  to  explain  blood  oxygenation  will  leave  out  some  capillaries.  I  take 
approximations to be mathematical imprecisions, usually in the form of estimations or 
probabilities. For example, a model of the solar system might construe the earth as a 
sphere, even though its actual shape is not perfectly spherical. The term “idealization” is 
a bit more amorphous. It applies broadly to distortions of the target system that serve 
various  pragmatic  purposes  (e.g.  to  make  aspects  of  the  system  more  easily 
comprehensible, or to include only those features necessary for a close approximation of 
mathematical features).
I will distinguish idealizations that I consider fictional from idealizations that I 
consider non-fictional by relying on a taxonomical tool introduced by Michael Weisberg 
(2007).   Weisberg helpfully divides models sometimes categorized as idealizations into 
three  categories:  Galilean  idealizations,  minimalist  idealizations,  and  multiple-models 
idealizations.  He  differentiates  these  categories  primarily  on  the  basis  of  their 
representational aims. When I speak of idealizations in this paper, I will refer to Galilean 
idealizations and minimalist idealizations only. All the models I consider will be single 
models  taken  to  be  internally  consistent,  whereas  multiple-models  idealizations  are 
combinations of incompatible models of the same phenomenon. Thus none of the models 
I discuss will be eligible for categorization as multiple-models idealizations. 
Galilean idealizations are those that distort the target system in order to make it 
more “computationally  tractable” (2007, p.  3). They admit  falsehoods only insofar as 
doing so is necessary for the model to be useful in fulfilling its representational aims. 
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According to Weisberg, the defining representational aim of a Galilean idealization is 
completeness,  the accurate and comprehensive depiction of the target system. Whatever 
distortions are made in Galilean idealizations, they are made to serve this aim (though, of 
course, truly complete representation is presumably unreachable for a model). As he puts 
it,“models generated by Galilean idealization are [...] approximate, but carry with them 
the intention of further revision, ultimately reaching for a more precise, accurate, and 
complete model” (p. 19). Minimalist idealizations, on the other hand, include distortions 
that purport to isolate the features of the target system that are causally responsible for the 
phenomenon in question. In Weisberg's words, “a minimalist model contains only those 
factors  that  make  a  diﬀerence  to  the  occurrence  and  essential  character  of  the 
phenomenon in question” (p. 5). Their representational aim, then, is to provide causal 
information. Specifically, Weisberg claims, they are designed to isolate one causal factor 
(p. 19). 
This digression into Weisberg's taxonomy of idealization is meant to illustrate the 
sorts  of  representational  aims  that  are  conventionally  taken  to  be  characteristic  of 
idealizations. Although the broad definition of idealization may appear to subsume the 
cases  of  fictions  I  will  present,  I  hope  to  show,  with  reference  to  these  typical 
representational  aims  of  idealizations,  that  the  cases  I  have  in  mind  are  importantly 
different from these conventional idealizations. Their aims are not the aims we typically 
understand as characteristic of idealizations. In my discussion of fictional models, I will  
try  to illustrate respects in  which the aims of  such models diverge  from the aims of 
completeness or causal isolation. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  these  categories  –  simplification,  approximation, 
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idealization – are not mutually exclusive. A single model may feature simplifications, 
approximations, and idealizations, or any combination thereof. The relevant feature that 
unifies these three categories is that, in spite of some disagreement about which models 
fall into which categories, the fact that all models will  fall into one or more of these  
categories is widely accepted as an inevitability of scientific modeling. Although it is not 
universally agreed upon, a common intuition is that these are unproblematic features of a 
scientific model.  If there are fictional models of the sort that interest me in this paper, 
they will be inaccurate in some further way. Specifically, they will feature representations 
of entities that are not taken to exist – even in approximate, simplified, or idealized forms 
– by the scientists who employ the models. Thus, I will have to show that the falsehoods 
in  any  example  of  a  scientific  model  with  fictional  elements  that  I  present  are  not 
falsehoods merely in virtue of being simplifications, approximations, or idealizations. 
Therefore, my first criterion that renders a model non-fictional is that the model's 
only  falsehoods  are  simplifications,  approximations,  or  idealizations  (understood  as 
distortions  made  with  the  representational  aims  noted  above).  I  will  call  this  the 
simplification, approximation, or idealization (hereafter SAI) criterion. 
B. Fictions do not represent our best guess at what the target system is really like.
My second criterion is, at least prima facie, more straightforward than my first: a 
fictional scientific model must contain components that are acknowledged by those who 
employ the model and subscribe to the accompanying theory  not to correspond to our 
best  guess  about  the  reality  of  the  target  system.  In  many  cases,  fictional  models 
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straightforwardly contradict accepted scientific theories (e.g. some renderings of electron 
orbitals). In other cases, fictional models contain elements that fail to constitute our best 
guess about the target system because we have no real evidence to support elements of 
the model (e.g. Maxwell's mechanistic model of the electromagnetic field). So, fictional 
models can fail to represent scientists' best guess in at least two ways: they can be false 
by the governing theory's lights, or they can, as Eric Winsberg puts it, be  unconcerned 
with  the  truth  (2009).  Here  again,  divergence  from the  theory's  best  guess  must  not 
merely consist of simplifications, approximations, or idealizations as explained above, in 
order for the model to be classified as fictional on my account.  
If  every  component  of  a  model  is  consistent  with the  governing theory's  best 
guess, the model will satisfy what I call the best guess criterion. If a model satisfies the 
best guess criterion, it is non-fictional. 
C. A Note of Qualification
It is important  to note that I will  be focusing on particular instances in which 
scientists  put  forth   models  with  fictional  elements  and  properly  regard  them  as 
explanatory. Whether some models qualify as fictional or non-fictional on my account 
will depend upon facts about the particular contexts of their introduction. For instance, it 
may be that scientists sometimes speak fictionally about electron orbitals in chemistry, 
and sometimes speak non-fictionally about  them. Whether  a model is  rightly deemed 
fictional will depend on whether the model in question is introduced in such a way that it 
satisfies my two criteria. As I will show in section IV, in some cases, as with electron 
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orbitals  models,  scientists  vacillate,  sometimes  employing  a  fictional  model  of  the 
phenomenon in question, sometimes employing a non-fictional model. 
2. Some Non-fictional models
As a foil to the cases of interest, it is helpful  to think of a few models that are 
straightforwardly non-fictional. Consider,  for instance,  modeling practices in ideal gas 
theory. Ideal  gases are modeled as collections of volume-less point particles that move 
randomly and do not exert forces on one another. Ideal gas models do not meet the best 
guess criterion. Our best guess about the reality of the target system is that gas molecules 
have volume, do exert forces on one another, and so on. However, models depicting how 
ideal  gases  behave  are  non-fictional  because  they  are  only  false  insofar  as  they  are 
idealizations.  Specifically,  I  take  ideal  gas  models  to  be  Galilean  idealizations.  The 
distortions made in ideal gas models are made with the aim of completeness. Ideal gas 
models are, so to speak, steps on the way to our best theory. Scientists set some values to 
zero that will turn out only to be very near to zero; gas particles are modeled as though 
they have no volume, when in fact they do; and so on. These omissions serve the aim of 
completeness  because  the  models  “carry  with  them the  intention of  further  revision” 
(Weisberg 2007, p. 19). Thus, ideal gas models meet my SAI criterion. They are non-
fictions. 
There are also non-fictional models in which the SAI criterion is not met, but the 
best guess criterion is. However, of necessity, we can only identify these in hindsight, 
after the falsehoods have been identified and the prior best guess replaced by a new best 
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guess. If such a model had been acknowledged to be false at the time of its employment, 
it would not have satisfied the best guess criterion. Though models featuring Ptolemaic 
epicycles  may  have  satisfied  the  best  guess  criterion  at  one  time,  the  same  model 
presented  today  would  not  meet  this  criterion  and  thus  not  qualify  as  non-fictional. 
Because  the  falsity  of  Ptolemaic  astronomy  was  not  known  to  the  scientists  who 
subscribed to such models, models employing Ptolemaic epicycles to explain celestial 
movement were  non-fictions at  the  time of  their  acceptance.  These models  had false 
elements  –  namely  epicycles  –  that  were  false  not  merely  in  virtue  of  being 
simplifications,  approximations,  or  idealizations.  That  epicycles  were  responsible  for 
observations of retrograde planetary motion was considered astronomy's best guess at the 
time. So these models met the best guess criterion. This case highlights an important 
aspect of how I mean to apply the terms “fiction” and “non-fiction.” Namely, the correct 
application of these terms will be relative to the scientific contexts in which the models 
are introduced.5 
Many cases of non-fictional models will satisfy both of my criteria. For instance, 
Thomas Schelling produced a series of models to explain the phenomenon of inevitable 
racial  segregation  in  neighborhoods  whose  residents  did  not  want  to  be  in  a  racial 
minority, even when they were motivated by a preference to live in racially integrated 
communities  (1969).  Here  he  describes  the  simplest  explanation  presented  by  the 
5 It is worth noting that some models could qualify as fictional without being of interest to the present 
investigation because they are not put forth as genuine explanations. For instance, if models featuring 
Ptolemaic  epicycles  were  still  employed  today  as  a  means  of  making  predictions  –  though 
acknowledged  not  to  feature  in  answer  the  relevant  “why?”  questions  typically  associated  with 
scientific explanation – they would fail to satisfy both my SAI criterion and my best guess criterion,  
but there would be no mystery about how they remain explanatory in spite of being fictions. They 
would  not  be  explanatory  because  they  would  not  be  put  forth  to  serve  the  purpose  scientific 
explanations are put forth to serve. 
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simplest of his models: 
Within a given set of boundaries, not both groups (colors, sexes) can enjoy 
numerical superiority. Within the population as a whole, the numerical ratio 
is determined at any given time; locally, in a city or neighborhood, a church 
or a school, either blacks or whites can be a majority. But if each insists on 
being a local majority, there is only one mixture that will do it: complete 
segregation. (p. 489)
Schelling showed that, in spite of their holding preferences for integration, as long as the 
individual residents were guided in their housing choices by an overruling preference not 
to be in a racial minority with respect to their immediate neighbors, segregation would 
develop over time.
Schelling's models involve mapping out hypothetical neighborhoods on grids and 
lines,  a  practice  that  constitutes  an  instance  of  idealization.  In  this  case,  the  model 
features both Galilean and minimalist idealizations:
For  illustration,  define  everybody's  “neighborhood”  as  extending  four 
neighbors on either side, and suppose that everyone is content if half his 
“neighbors” are the same color as he. If fewer than half are his color, he 
moves in either direction to the nearest point (measured in the number he 
passes on the way) at which half his eight nearest neighbors are the same 
color as he. (1969, p. 490)
We know that most real neighborhoods are not perfectly grid-like, nor are they usually 
arranged on a straight  line.  But because actual neighborhoods come in all  manner of 
configurations, some stipulations and assumptions (distortions) must be made to make the 
phenomenon computationally  tractable.  In  this  respect,  Schelling's  model  presents  a 
Galilean idealization.  The representational aim of modeling neighborhoods as grids or 
straight lines is still completeness. It is not that there is a more accurate way to represent  
the configuration of neighborhoods that is being ignored for some other purpose. Rather, 
we do not  think there is  some uniform arrangement  of  neighborhoods that  we could 
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identify and add to the model to make it more complete. With the aim of representing the 
phenomenon of interest in this case as completely as possible, a grid or a line is perhaps 
the best we can do. 
Furthermore,  people  do  not  make  decisions  to  move  in  such  simple  and 
predictable ways. Human decision making is multi-faceted and complex. Even if we hold 
the preference ranking identified by Schelling, this ranking cannot hope to exhaust all the 
relevant  preferences humans have  about  where  they live.  We might  not  move to  the 
closest available house in which we are not the minority if we do not like the size of its  
backyard, for example. However the model is designed in part to isolate and develop one 
causal factor that explains racial segregation. There are assuredly other causal factors that 
this model does not seek to represent. The model thus contains a minimalist idealization. 
The salient falsehoods in Schelling's models are not false in some further way (beyond 
simplification,  approximation,  and idealization),  and thus  the  models  satisfy  my SAI 
criterion. Nothing about these models contradicts the background theoretical framework 
or represents something other than our best guess about the reality of the target system, so 
they also satisfy the best guess criterion. 
3. Three cases of Fictional Models
I will now present three cases of models that satisfy neither my SAI criterion nor 
my best guess criterion and thus qualify as fictional on my account. In this section, I will 
describe the models and provide some evidence that scientists take (or took, in the case of 
my historical example) the models to be both fictional and explanatory. 
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A. Electron orbitals in chemistry 
Scientists often employ fictions in modeling atomic and molecular electron orbitals. Such 
models are used to explain, among other things, chemical valence. Scientists regularly 
speak as though orbitals have features that are not consistent with the accepted theoretical 
framework  to  which  they  are  committed,  namely,  one  in  accord  with  most  standard 
interpretations of quantum mechanics. Critically, it is often the case that scientists depict 
orbitals as having properties inconsistent with quantum mechanics while simultaneously 
acknowledging this inconsistency. Moreover, they take the very model they acknowledge 
to be fictional to furnish genuine scientific explanations.  
The  depiction of  electron  orbitals  as  configurations  of  electrons  in  atoms and 
molecules is a fundamental starting point for contemporary students of chemistry6. In the 
simple case of  atomic  models,  electron orbitals  are  generally  modeled as  “shells”  or 
“energy levels”  surrounding nuclei.  Each orbital  is  meant  to be a  clearly demarcated 
region in which either one or two electrons is likely to be located (Keeler and Wothers 
2003,  p.  36).  Orbitals  correspond  to  wavefunctions  that  describe  the  probabilistic 
arrangement of electrons in the system (p. 39). Electrons are said to “fill” orbitals in a 
designated order, and the electron configuration of a particular atom or molecule will 
specify which orbitals are occupied (p. 35). Once we have the electron configuration of 
an  atom,  we  can  determine  its  valence,  and  thus  make  predictions  about  chemical 
reactions. 
6 For a perspicuous overview of the history of modeling chemical systems, see Scerri (1991, pp. 310-
317). 
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For some time now, it  has been acknowledged that the literal  posit of orbitals 
featuring in some of the models that contemporary chemists put forth as explanatory is 
inconsistent with aspects of quantum mechanics. Eric Scerri explains: 
It  is  now known that  the  view of  electrons  in  individual  well-defined 
quantum states represents an approximation. The new quantum mechanics 
formulated  in  1926  shows  unambiguously  that  this  model  is  strictly 
incorrect.  The  field  of  chemistry  continues  to  adhere  to  the  model, 
however. (1991, p. 317)
It  is  inaccurate,  according to  most  interpretations  of  quantum mechanics,  to  describe 
individual  electrons  as  being  in  individual,  specifiable  spatial  locations.7 Chemists 
acknowledge  that  we  must  view  the  wavefunctions  associated  with  orbitals  as 
approximations rather than as fixed delineations of an electron's spatial position, but these 
wavefunctions are still treated as approximations of a specifiable electron configuration,  
as though they provide us with our best guess about the spatial location of the electrons 
(Keeler and Wothers 2003, p. 39). Yet, there is no such specifiable spatial arrangement of 
electrons, according to the governing theory. There is no fact of the matter about where 
the electrons in a system are located. Rather, the wavefunctions associated with orbitals 
designate the probability of detecting electrons in regions of the system. Contemporary 
chemists are, of course, keenly aware of this. As one common introductory chemistry text 
– Why Chemical Reactions Happen by James Keelor and Peter Wothers – clarifies: “the 
electron is not localized to a particular  region nor is it  going round a particular orbit; 
rather it is smeared out over space” (2003, p. 41). Notice, however, that even this more 
careful  description  of  an  electron's  being  “smeared  out  over  space”  could  easily  be 
7 There are interpretations of quantum mechanics that do attribute positions to electrons. On David 
Bohm's interpretation, for example, all particles have positions (1965).
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interpreted as a description of a determinate spatial location (i.e. it is natural to read the 
latter part of the sentence as suggesting that the electron is smeared out over a particular  
region of space).
The  critical  point  to  note  about  the  orbitals  case  is  that,  though  scientists 
recognize that orbitals are merely approximations of a sort, they do not always model 
them as such. The cases in which scientists model orbitals  in some further false way 
(beyond modeling  them as  simplifications,  approximations,  and idealizations)  are  the 
cases I consider fictional. Orbitals are not always modeled by scientists as fictions, but in 
many cases they are. Models featuring orbitals often reflect properties (such as spatial 
location)  that  are  no longer  part  of  our  best  guess  about  the  properties  of  electrons, 
though they may have been our best guess at one time (for instance, in the classical Bohr 
model of the atom, in which orbitals were presented as the literal, definable trajectories of 
electrons around the nucleus of an atom).8 
Orbitals tend to be modeled fictionally when put to certain explanatory uses (e.g. 
in modeling electron configurations to explain valence). See, for example, the following 
explanation in a popular contemporary chemistry textbook: 
When  we  consider  the  chemical  reactions  of  atoms,  our  attention  is 
usually focused on the distribution of electrons in the  outer shell  of the 
atom [...] This is because the outer electrons (those in the outer shell) are 
the ones that are exposed to the other atoms when the atoms react. The 
inner  electrons  of  an  atom, called the  core  electrons,  are  buried deep 
within the atom and normally do not play a role when chemical bonds are 
formed. (Brady and Senese 2004, p. 331)9
8  Alisa Bokulich provides a helpful historical overview of how scientists (including Neils Bohr) came to 
view the  classical orbitals model as fictitious (2009). 
9 This fictional modeling of chemical orbitals appears not to be limited to textbooks; Scerri argues that  
orbitals are treated as real entities by contemporary chemists both in atomic spectroscopy and in the 
calculation of an atom's energy (1991, p. 319-9). In at least the latter case, a model that treats orbitals as 
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In this passage, electrons are overtly described as being spatially located. Chemists could 
speak   non-fictionally  here  instead  and  explain  the  phenomenon  of  valence  without 
providing a fictional model, but it seems there are incentives to retaining the fictional 
language. For instance, while Scerri cautions against chemists putting too much faith in 
the continued success of this fictional model, he acknowledges that it does a better job 
than  any  other  available  (and  perhaps  didactically  accessible)  model  of  conveying 
reliable information about the chemical properties of atoms and molecules (1991, p. 321). 
One clear practical benefit  of modeling chemical valence in this fictional way is that 
doing so provides a more intuitively comprehensible picture. It is, it seems, more difficult 
to  convey complicated  interactions  between probability  density  functions  (the  current 
best guess about what orbitals actually are) than it is to inure someone to science's best 
guess  about  the  nature  of  electrons  by  initially  portraying  them as  spatially  located 
objects  moving between clearly  defined energy levels  that  resemble  planetary  orbital 
trajectories. There is thus a didactic benefit of speaking fictionally in this context, and 
doing so may be unproblematic because the fictional model has a great deal of predictive 
power – in fact just as much as our best non-fictional model of valence would. 
Could these cases of modeling electron orbitals actually just be approximations, 
idealizations,  or simplifications? As I noted above,  the wavefunctions associated with 
orbitals are acknowledged to be approximations of a sort. However, as they are presented 
in these models, orbitals  are not approximations. They are not  merely mathematically 
imprecise. Rather, they are a false description of the target system. They are not our best 
real entities appears to be the only practicable approach in current use (p. 321). 
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guess  at  the  way  the  target  system  actually  is  because  we  know,  given  standard 
interpretations  of  quantum  mechanics,  that  there  are  no  specifiable  spatial-defined 
arrangements of electrons. Such arrangements are what orbitals in these models purport 
to depict, and so we must conclude that they are fictional. 
Put  simply,  orbitals  cannot  merely  be  approximations  of  electrons'  definite 
positions because we know that electrons do not have definite positions. One might ask, 
then,  why  an  orbital  cannot  be  an  approximation,  simplification,  or  idealization  of 
something else, like the likelihood of detecting an electron at a specified spatial location 
if we took a measurement. This is certainly how orbitals are sometimes described. When 
chemists describe what they think orbitals really are, they say they are really probabilistic 
wavefunctions whose shapes are formed by the distribution of regions in which we would 
likely find an electron over many measurements. Speaking of orbitals this way is non-
fictional because both the best guess and SAI criteria are met. But this is consistent with 
chemists modeling orbitals fictionally in other cases. In seems that chemists often use 
orbitals  as  fictions  and  tell  fictional  narratives  about  them  (while  at  the  same  time 
acknowledging the non-fictional story that is more accurate). When we are specifying the 
electron configuration of an atom to determine its valence, we rely on orbitals (in the 
classical sense) and a story about their shapes, how they fit together, and how they get 
filled in a certain order.  We want to know about the configuration of electrons in the 
outer,  highest energy level  “shell” so we can explain bonding.  Speaking in  this way, 
about inner and outer shells and the definition locations of electrons within those shells, 
is speaking of orbitals as fictional entities rather than as probability density functions. In 
contexts for which it is made clear that orbitals are being spoken about in ways that are 
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consistent  with  chemistry's  best  guess  about  electrons,  not  as  entities  with  spatial 
properties, orbitals are spoken about non-fictionally. The details of a particular case settle 
the matter of whether the model in question is fictional. 
B. Memory as a pushdown stack in neuroscience
The model  of human memory as  a  pushdown stack,  a  “serial  self-terminating 
process” was originally proposed by John Theios, et al (1973). The model is designed to 
explain the hierarchical, last-in-first-out, patterns observed in experimentation on human 
memory. Consider the following description of the model from an introductory text on 
probabilistic modeling of psychological processes: 
The model derives its name by assuming that memory is arranged as a 
pushdown stack, that is, that there is a hierarchical ordering to memory 
with the more frequently presented items tending toward the top of the 
stack. The popular analogy here is to the almost magical stack of lunch 
trays so often encountered in cafeterias. We pick a tray up and the rest of 
the stack rises until its place is taken by the newly exposed tray. Similarly, 
when a tray is replaced on top of the stack, the whole stack settles down 
somewhat so that the topmost tray is almost always at the same level. In a 
pushdown stack, trays are accessed on a last-in, first-out basis. (Townsend 
and Ashby 1983, p. 134)
This model has had a great deal of predictive success in experimental contexts, especially 
in experiments about short-term memory. In particular, it explains well the probability 
that a particular stimulus will be recalled, taking into account the serial order in which it 
was presented to a subject. Thus, the model is taken by neuroscientists to be explanatory, 
to accurately depict  something about the structure of memory retention and recall that 
accounts for why we observe the patterns we do. 
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However,  though  scientists  take  the  model  to  proffer  a  genuine  scientific 
explanation, they acknowledge that it is a false model in a number of ways. For instance, 
Juliana Goschler points out that no one thinks we've ever encountered anyone whose 
memory is  full, though the model indicates that memory has a finite capacity (2007 p. 
13). So though a pushdown stack can be full, scientists do not, by and large, think the 
same is true of human memory. Also, items in memory are importantly different from 
trays in a stack; you can re-represent to a subject an item that is already in her memory,  
for instance, whereas trays in a stack each have one instance only. And when you do re-
represent something to someone, that item does not necessarily move to the “top of the 
stack,”  as  it  would  have  to  in  the  tray  case  (Townsend  and  Ashby  1983,  p.  135). 
Moreover,  this model is  an instance of a theme in neuroscientific modeling in which 
brains are depicted as containers and memory depicted as storage space that is filled. 
Goschler argues that this language is pervasive in neuroscientific modeling, even though 
scientists, when pressed, would not be able to earnestly ground the attribution of spatial 
properties to memory and other brain functions (pp. 11-14). 
Does the pushdown stack model for memory satisfy either of my criteria for a 
non-fictional  model?  Are  all  the  falsehoods  I  have  identified  in  this  model  merely 
simplifications,  approximations,  or  idealizations?  Perhaps  the  model's  depiction  of 
memory as finite in capacity represents an approximation of a sort, but to think this, we 
would have to think there was something like “the capacity of human memory” that the 
model could be approximating. As this seems to rely on the suspect depiction of a brain 
as a container, it seems that this manner of calling this falsehood an approximation misses  
the mark. Moreover, the model includes further falsehoods about memory that cannot, by 
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any stretch, be construed as mathematical estimations, such as the depiction of memory 
as  a  process  for  which  each  item  can  be  represented  only  once  in  the  hierarchical 
ordering. 
Could this model be an idealization – a distortion with the representational aim of 
completeness  or  isolating  a  cause?  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  either  of  those 
representational  aims  would  map  onto  this  model.  It  is  hard  to  see  how  models  of 
memory as a pushdown stack could be distortions that “carry with them the intention of 
further revision” (Weisberg 2007, p. 19). There does not appear to be a way to revise the 
model such that the fictions are removed without the features the model is introduced to 
communicate  – such as its qualities of being serial  and self-terminating – being also 
jettisoned. Likewise, it is not clear a single cause is being identified by the model. Rather, 
it  seems that the representational aim of the model is to draw out several  features of 
memory's structure.
Does the model satisfy the best guess criterion? The answer to this seems to be a 
straightforward no. To name just one respect in which it violates this criterion, it is part of 
scientists' best guess about the target system that memory items can be re-represented. 
This is contradicted by the model. Moreover, it is not part of scientists' best guess about 
memory that it is finite, so the model represents something other than the best available 
guess  about  the  reality  of  the  target  system.  Thus,  I  take  scientists  who  apply  the 
pushdown stack model to memory to be presenting a fictional model. 
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C. Maxwell's mechanistic model of the electromagnetic field
James Clerk Maxwell, in his 1861 paper “On Physical Lines of Force,” modeled 
the electromagnetic field as an arrangement of simple machines including gears, cogs, 
and idle wheels (1997).  Here is a passage from the paper, in which he discusses the 
introduction of an idle wheel to the model:
It is difficult to understand how the motion of one part of the medium can 
coexist with, and even produce, an opposite motion of a part in contact 
with it. 
The only conception which has at all aided me in conceiving of this 
kind  of  motion  is  that  of  the  vortices  being  separated  by  a  layer  of 
particles, revolving each on its own axis in the opposite direction to that of 
the vortices, so that the contiguous surfaces of the particles and of the 
vortices have the same motion. 
In  mechanism, when two wheels  are  intended to revolve in  the 
same direction, a wheel is placed between them so as to be in gear with 
both, and this wheel is called an “idle wheel.” The hypothesis about the 
vortices which I have to suggest is that a layer of particles acting as idle 
wheels,  is  interspersed between each vortex and the next,  so that each 
vortex has a tendency to make the neighbouring vortices revolve in the 
same direction with itself. (1997, p. 158)
The aim of the model is to explain the apparently action-at-a-distance phenomena we 
observe in electricity and magnetism. Maxwell is describing a physical system made up 
of simple machines that allows us to explain the character of the phenomena we observe 
in these contexts (e.g. why a magnet (or an iron filing) moves in a particular direction 
when placed in a particular relation to another magnet). 
On what appears to be the most plausible interpretation of his work in this paper, 
Maxwell did not think there were actual material mechanisms in magnetic fields. Thomas 
Simpson explains: 
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Maxwell indulges in the invention of wheels and gears to fill the vacuum 
and do his bidding in a way that Rube Goldberg might envy. The reader 
must be the judge, but I submit that Maxwell has tongue in cheek here and 
does not seriously intend that the devices he conjures up would in fact be 
found  to  exist  in  the  form he  is  describing  [...]  Maxwell  is  claiming 
latitude to think things through to the end, to pursue the question whether 
any  imaginable physical  system could accomplish what  electromagnets 
and pith balls are regularly observed to do. What is at stake may be the 
very  concept  of  an  intelligible  relation  of  cause  and  effect  in  nature. 
(Simpson 1997, p. 40)
Taking Simpson's interpretation for granted, the point of Maxwell's model was not to 
accurately describe what is going on in the electromagnetic field. It was to show that it is 
possible to have a system that obeys all the fundamental laws of physics and functions 
like the electromagnetic field does. The point  was neither to make predictions nor to 
provide, say, causal information about a particular empirical phenomenon. It was to give 
an argument that something analogous to the electromagnetic field is possible. Maxwell 
shows  that  there  is  at  least  one  intelligible  explanation of  the  electric  and  magnetic 
phenomena we observe, even if the actual model does not advance our understanding of 
the field beyond “something we know not what” that meets the basic demands of physical 
possibility10 
I take it to be quite clear that Maxwell's model does not satisfy the best guess 
criterion. It does not appear to be the case that Maxwell means to foster any confidence 
that the electromagnetic field actually contains idle wheels. It seems equally clear that 
this model is not a simplification (a  mere omission of detail) or an approximation (a 
mathematical imprecision). Could it then be an idealization with a representational aim 
either of completeness or of identifying a single cause? These seem inapt descriptions of 
10 Eric Winsberg provides  an overview of some “something we know not what” fictional  posits (e.g. 
silogen atoms) employed in models of nanoscale solids for purposes of simulating and designing nano-
electromechanical systems (2009). 
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the model's representational aims. The aim is to represent a possibility for the sake of 
establishing  that  such  a  possibility  exists,  not  to  advance  our  understanding  of  the 
particular features of the electromagnetic field. Moreover, given that Maxwell does not 
take gears and cogs to be real causes of the electric or magnetic phenomena we observe, 
it does not seem that this model could aim to isolate a cause of these phenomena. Thus, I 
conclude  that  Maxwell's  model  meets  neither  the  best  guess  criterion  nor  the  SAI 
criterion, and is therefore rightly categorized as a fictional model. 
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Chapter II: On the Explanatory Capacity of Fictional Models
1. Introduction
In what follows, I will sketch a way of understanding fictional models that 
dispels the air of mystery some recent commentators have sensed in the fact that 
some such models  appear  to  be  explanatory in  spite  of  being fictional.  I  will 
suggest  that  the  best  way  to  understand  the  class  of  fictional  models  I  have 
identified is to see them as a type of metaphor. A brief investigation into how 
metaphors of this type function will  shed some light on the respects in which 
these models are fictional and the respects in which they are explanatory. I aim to 
show that considering fictional models from this more perspicuous vantage point 
ultimately  dissolves  the  oft-perceived  tension  between  their  categorization  as 
fictional and their categorization as explanatory. When properly understood, these 
models  turn  out  not  to  constitute  a  special  class  of  explanatory  entities  that 
requires a special notion of explanation, as some theorists have suggested. 
2. The Paradox of Explanatory Fictional Models
In Part I, I discussed some widely accepted ways in which models can be 
false without losing their explanatory capacity.  These were cases in which the 
models were false only in virtue of involving simplifications, approximations, or 
idealizations (SAI).  While there remain unanswered puzzles about  how falsehoods of 
these sorts feature in scientific explanations, it is generally taken for granted that models 
can be explanatory despite containing these types of falsehoods. In my brief examinations  
of three putative fictional models, I concluded that it looks like there really are scientific 
models – both ones currently in use and ones that have served important roles in the 
history of science – that are (or were) acknowledged by those who employ (or employed) 
them to be false in some deeper way. The questions of central interest to the remainder of 
my investigation are whether and how something with a deeper sort of falsehood can 
nevertheless count as explanatory. After all, as I demonstrated in the previous section, 
there  is  an  intuitive  sense  in  which  some  fictional  models  really  do  appear  to  be 
explaining phenomena in their target systems. Given the persistence in scientific practice 
of  models acknowledged to be fictional,  it  also appears as though the scientists  who 
employ them take them to be capable of furnishing scientific explanations.
One way to  understand  the  puzzle  I  hope  to  solve  is  by  spelling  it  out  as  a 
paradox. There are three mutually inconsistent claims, each of which appears true on its 
own, that constitute the paradox of explanatory fictional models. These are (1) that the 
fictional models are false, (2) that the fictional models explain, and (3) that only true 
depictions of target systems can explain.11 12
The most straightforward resolution of this paradox would be to give up one of 
these premises altogether. An approach that is gaining some momentum in the literature is  
to abandon (3). Alisa Bokulich takes this path, for instance (2008, 2009, 2011, 2012). As I 
11 I owe this formulation of the paradox to Matt Kotzen. 
12 In (1), I take “false” to mean false in some further way than being one of SAI. Likewise, in (3), I take  
“true” to mean true apart from including inevitable instances of SAI. 
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will discuss in section 3, she argues that we should see fictional explanation as a special  
category of genuine scientific explanations in which genuinely false (in a deeper way 
than  merely  being  one  of  SAI)  depictions  of  the  target  system  are  nonetheless 
explanatory. I will seek to provide an account of how fictional models can be explanatory 
that avoids the abandonment of (3). I will assume that, given the prima facie plausibility 
of (3), we should prefer an account of explanatory fictions according to which (3) is 
preserved  unless,  on  pain  of  contradiction,  we  are  unable  to  reconcile  (3)  with  our 
understanding of the important roles these fictional models play in science.
In sections  4  through 6,  I  will  articulate  my own account  of  how we should 
understand  cases of fictional models like the ones I considered in Part I. Rather than 
abandoning any of these premises altogether, I will argue that (1) and (2), as stated here,  
are  imprecise  and  therefore  obscure  what  is  actually  going  on  in  cases  of  fictional 
models. I will advocate the adoption of a clearer articulation of the sense in which the 
models are fictional as well as the sense in which the models explain. Once I present 
alternate accounts of (1) and (2), it will be clear that the modified versions of (1) and (2) 
will not generate a paradox with (3). Thus, I conclude that there is no reason to abandon 
(3) in order to accommodate the role played by fictional models in scientific explanation. 
I take it as a virtue of my account that it does not call for the rejection of (3). 
3. Resolving the Paradox by Rejecting the Truth Requirement : Bokulich's Account 
One  way to resolve  the paradox – a resolution I  will  ultimately reject  – is  to 
remain committed to (1) and (2), but to abandon (3). This is to say that genuinely false 
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models can be genuinely explanatory, and this is a reason to give up the strict requirement  
in (3) that only true depictions of target systems can explain. As I noted above, this is the 
general strategy Alisa Bokulich takes in  her account of how fictional  models explain 
(2008, 2009, 2011, 2012). 
In her defense of the explanatory capacity of fictions, Bokulich devotes much of 
her  attention  to  the  explanatory  capacity  of  models  depicting  orbitals  classically,  as 
spatially-defined electron trajectories (2008, 2011, 2012). In addition to referencing one 
of  the  same cases  that  I  have  examined,  she  appears  to  be  using  roughly  the  same 
definition  of  a  fictional  model  that  I  spelled  out  above,  taking  care  to  differentiate 
genuine fictions from idealizations, simplifications, and approximations (2008). Thus, I 
take her to be understanding fictional models in at least the same general sense that I have  
been understanding them. 
Bokulich abandons the true depiction of a target system as a necessary condition 
for a scientific model's being explanatory (2012, p. 18). Borrowing a term from Philip 
Kitcher, she reasons that a scientific fiction is explanatory as long as it is legitimately 
included in the scientific community's “explanatory store” at the time of its employment 
(2012, p. 17).13 Because she does not take truth to be a necessary condition for inclusion 
in  the  explanatory  store,  she  abandons  truth  as  a  necessary  condition  for  a  fictional 
model's being explanatory as well. Without being able to appeal to truth to determine 
which fictional models are explanatory, Bokulich must provide some other desiderata. 
According to Bokulich's account, a fictional model explains only if it meets three 
13 Kitcher introduces this term to refer to all the scientific argument patterns that scientists legitimately 
have at their disposal for explaining phenomena (1981). These argument patterns are legitimately 
employed when the set of things in the explanatory store is maximally unifying. 
26
criteria (taken together, she refers to these three criteria as the “justificatory step”) (2008, 
2011, 2012). I take Bokulich to be specifying these three criteria as necessary, but not 
sufficient, for a fictional model's explanatory success (2012, p. 19). She provides these 
three  criteria  as  part  of  more  general  account  in  which  she identifies  further  criteria 
models must meet in order to be explanatory (2011). I will omit these details from the 
present investigation because they do not address the explanatory capacity of fictional 
models as such. 
The first criterion Bokulich advances is that fictional models, rather than being 
true, must bear some sort of “contextual relevance relation set by the current state of 
scientific  knowledge,  which  specifies  what  sort  of  entities,  states,  and  processes  are 
potentially relevant to the explanation of the explanandum phenomenon” (2012, pp. 20-
21). This is the explanatory store inclusion criterion,  and it  makes what counts as an 
explanation  on  her  account  epistemically  relative.  The  second  criterion  is  that  the 
scientific community must have specified the domain in which the model is applicable, 
“specifying  where  –  and  to  what  extent  –  the  model  can  be  trusted  as  an  adequate 
representation of the relevant features of the world for the purpose(s) in question” (2012, 
p. 21). The third criterion is that scientists must have some sort of “key” that will allow 
them to “translate statements about the fictional [...] elements in the model into correct 
conclusions about  the  target system” (2012,  p.  21).  She does  not  provide an explicit 
account of what such a key must involve, but she does specify that “the translation key is 
from statements about the fictions to statements about the underlying structure or causes 
of the explanandum-phenomenon,” indicating that the translation must not be merely a 
statement of the explanandum, for instance (2012, p. 20). 
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By applying these three criteria, Bokulich thinks we will come to understand that 
classical  periodic  orbitals  are  an  explanatory  fiction  whereas  fictions  that  we  are 
antecedently  committed  to  denying  as  explainers,  like  Ptolemaic  epicycles,  are  not 
explanatory  fictions  (2008,  2009,  2011,  2012).  The  distinction,  in  most  cases  she 
considers, is determined by the first condition – orbitals remain in the explanatory store 
in contemporary science whereas Ptolemaic epicycles do not. 
So, according to this picture, fictions themselves are explanatory even though they 
are falsehoods.  Bokulich's presentation of the third criterion does not make what  she 
means by “correct conclusions about the target system” explicit, but a plausible reading is 
that  she  means  for  the  translational  key  to  translate  false  statements  into  true  ones 
somehow.  If  this  is  right,  fictions  can  be  explanatory  only  if  they  are  somehow 
translatable into truths,  so they must  bear a special  relation to  the truth of the target 
system. However, Bokulich insists that it is the fictions themselves, not merely the truths 
into which they are translated by the key, that are doing the explaining. In this insistence, 
she gives up premise (3) of the paradox outlined above. 
Something worth noting about Bokulich's account of how fictional models explain 
is that she appears to have a more expansive definition of “explain” in mind than I do.  
She often defends the explanatory capacity of fictional models by insisting that they are 
capable  of  generating  genuine  knowledge.  For  example,  she  says:  “Although  it  is 
certainly not the case that all fictions can explain, I believe that some fictions can give us 
genuine insight into the way the world is, and hence be genuinely explanatory and yield 
real understanding.” (2009, p. 94). She says this specifically in defense of the explanatory 
capacity  of  the  orbitals  case:  “although  these  classical  trajectories  are  also  useful 
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calculational tools, they are not mere fictions. Insofar as these closed orbits are giving us 
genuine insight into the structure of the quantum dynamics, they are explanatory fictions” 
(2009,  p.  106).  Indeed,  throughout  her  discussions  of  the  explanatory  capacities  of 
fictional  models  and  scientific  fictions  broadly  construed,  Bokulich  differentiates  the 
explanatory fictions from the non-explanatory fictions (in her words, the “mere fictions”) 
by identifying as explanatory any fiction that gives us “genuine insight” into the truth of 
the target system. She reiterates repeatedly that a fictional representation is explanatory 
only if it is able to generate genuine knowledge. I take this to be evidence that she is 
requiring for explanatory success something like rhetorical success – a model's success at 
conveying the genuine insight, in point of fact.
But for the purpose of this discussion, I want to stipulate that when I ask whether 
models  are  explanatory,  no  part  of  what  I  am  asking  includes  whether  they  are 
rhetorically  successful.  There  are  all  sorts  of  functions  that  are  easily  confused with 
scientific explanation in the strict sense. There is no doubt that fictions can perform a host  
of important functions in science apart from being explanatory in the strict sense I mean 
to employ. For instance, they can be didactically useful; that is, they can make a process 
comprehensible to someone for whom it was incomprehensible before. This seems to be 
much of what is going on when the orbitals model is presented fictionally to explain 
chemical valence in chemistry textbooks. However, such functions are not the ones that I 
would need the fictions to perform in order to deem them scientifically explanatory. In 
general, I take a model to be explanatory if and only if it provides an adequate answer to 
the right sort of “why?” question about the target system (where the right sort of question 
will usually be in the form “Why did x occur?” or “Why does x have some property?”). If 
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my analysis of Bokulich's usage is correct, she is not unique in using the term “explain” 
more loosely than I intend to use it in the present investigation. It is thus possible that her 
rejection of premise (3) in the paradox is a rejection of a much weaker claim than the one 
I take (3) to be conveying. In any case, I take any account that must reject (3) to be 
making a significant conceptual sacrifice, either in over-extending the usage of the term 
“explain” or in rejecting a highly intuitively plausible governing principle of scientific 
explanation.
4. Fictional Models as Metaphors
I  will  now  present  my  own  account  of  the  explanatory  capacity  of  fictional 
models,  in  which  I  argue  that  premise  (3)  from the  paradox of  explanatory  fictional 
models can be preserved without undermining the explanatory value of these models. 
The  idea  that  something  strictly  false  can  nonetheless  explain  is  not  an  alien 
notion  or  one  unique  to  scientific  contexts.  In  fact,  there  is  a  widely-acknowledged 
common occurrence of literal falsehoods conveying truths both in literature and everyday 
language. Metaphors are statements that are literally false but ultimately unhindered in 
their communicative success by their falsity. It is illuminating, I will show, to understand 
fictional models of the sort I have described above as a class of metaphors. Thinking of 
fictional  models as metaphors reveals  how they can be literally  false  depictions of  a 
system and at the same time communicate true claims about that system. Given that it is 
widely accepted that metaphorical language can convey something true without being 
literally true, it should be the case that, if we can show fictional models to be metaphors,  
this lends plausibility to the claim that fictional models can be both false and explanatory. 
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In this section,  I will  defend the proposal that fictional models can provide scientific 
explanations because, though they are literally false, they may be metaphorically true. 
What would it mean for a fictional model to provide an explanation by serving as 
something akin to a metaphor? To answer this question, it will first be useful to introduce 
some terminology introduced to describe how metaphors function to convey meaning. 
A. Primary versus Secondary Subject 
Philosophers and linguists who study metaphor distinguish the primary subject in 
a metaphor from the secondary subject.14 The primary subject is the topic actually under 
consideration in the context in which the metaphor is introduced. The secondary subject 
is the subject introduced to suggest an analogy with the primary subject. The secondary 
subject becomes a sort of tool for saying something about the primary subject. Consider 
for  example  the  extended  metaphor,  drawn  out  in  Jacques'  famous  monologue  in 
Shakespeare’s  As You Like It, that  begins: “All the world's a stage, and the men and 
women merely players” (1997). Here, the primary subject is unscripted human life and 
the secondary subject is a theatrical production. Obviously, Jacques is not saying that all 
human activity is literally scripted or literally taking place in a theater. He is drawing out 
relevant similarities between life as depicted theatrically and life as it is experienced by 
people outside of a theatrical context. The similarities amount to a series of claims about 
the  types  of  experiences  humans  have  over  the  course  of  a  life  (e.g.  uncertainty  in 
childhood, moodiness in romantic love, and wisdom in later life) and the many roles an 
actor  is  expected  to  play.  Jacques'  metaphor  conveys  true  claims  about  the  primary 
14 This terminology was introduced by Monroe Beardsley (1962). 
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subject,  even though the  monologue,  taken literally,  falsely  attributes  properties  of  a 
staged production (the secondary subject) to unscripted life (the primary subject). 
The  entire  content  of  a  metaphor  can  be  broken  down into  claims  about  the 
primary  subject  and  the  secondary  subject.  In  the  three  cases  of  putative  fictional 
scientific models discussed above, the primary subjects are the mechanisms underlying 
chemical  valence,  short-term  memory,  and  the  electromagnetic  field.  So  we  should 
understand the fictional  models  themselves as  being presented in  terms of  secondary 
subjects, introduced to reference and suggest analogies with the primary subjects. Both 
the references to the secondary subjects and the references to the primary subjects are 
included in the models.  According to  the analysis  I  will  provide,  the falsehoods that 
render  explanatory  models  fictional  will  turn  out  to  be  attributions  of  features  of 
secondary subjects to primary subjects.15 
B. Paraphrasable Metaphors versus Unparaphrasable Metaphors 
Another important feature of metaphors is that they must be either paraphrasable 
or unparaphrasable. In other words, either the content about the primary subject can be 
15 It could be that a metaphorical model falsely attributes a property to the secondary subject. I will  
remain agnostic with respect to whether this would necessarily constitute a failure of the metaphor to  
convey something true. In at least some cases, a metaphor containing a false attribution of properties 
to  the secondary  subject  would be the reason the  metaphor  failed to  the  have  content  its  author 
intended. For example, imagine that a metaphor's author knew that dynamite often consists of sawdust  
soaked in  nitroglycerin,  but  was under  the  mistaken  impression  that  the  sawdust  rather  than  the 
nitroglycerin was the explosive component. Further imagine that the author, in attempting to convey  
information about the irascible character of a friend, described him as “sawdust.” In this case, the 
metaphor does not have the content its author intended. By illustrating such an example, I mean to  
suggest that it is not the case that all property attributions about the secondary subject are trivially true 
in virtue of being stipulated. Falsely identifying properties of the secondary subject can be one reason 
a metaphor fails to have the content it was intended to have. There might be some cases of benign  
falsehoods  in  a  metaphor's  attribution  of  properties  to  the  secondary  subject  (ones  that  do  not 
undermine the metaphor's having the content its author intended), but I am unable to think of any such 
examples. 
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fully expressed in non-metaphorical language, or the content about the primary subject 
cannot  be fully  expressed in  non-metaphorical  language.  In many cases,  if  not  in  all 
cases, metaphors seem to provide one way of saying something that could be stated in 
another  way,  specifically  in  non-metaphorical  language.  Often,  it  turns  out  that 
paraphrasable metaphors employ strictly false language (e.g.  property attributions that 
may be true of the secondary subject but are false of the primary subject) as a kind of 
shorthand for some other content (about the primary subject) that can be stated in literal 
terms, but that would be more complicated or tedious to state literally.  The benefits of 
choosing  the  metaphorical  language might  be  aesthetic,  pragmatic,  or  determined  by 
myriad other interests. To think that that all metaphors function in this way would be to 
think that all metaphors are paraphrasable.16 
Some  theorists  deny  that  all  metaphors  are  paraphrasable.  These  theorists 
typically identify a richness of expression or evocative character that is not translatable 
into  literal  language  as  the  basis  for  their  contention  that  some  metaphors  are 
unparaphrasable.17 Some  part  of  the  meaning  of  unparaphrasable  metaphors  would 
inevitably be lost in any attempt to translate such a metaphor into literal language, they 
claim.  For  instance,  you might  think that  “Juliet  is  the  sun”  would  lose  some of  its 
meaning  if  translated  in  any  non-metaphorical  language  because  the  richness  of  the 
comparison  would  not  be  exhausted  by  any literal  translation.  A metaphor  might  be 
unparaphrasable in virtue of being “open textured,” or as Friedrich Waismann put it when 
16 Stanley Cavell, for instance spells out a version of this claim, according to which we must understand  
metaphors as paraphrasable in order to understand them as meaningful, though he does not ultimately 
advocate that all metaphors are entirely paraphrasable (1969, pp. 78-79).
17  For a helpful discussion of three ways of holding that not all metaphors are paraphrasable, see 
Stewart (1971).
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he  introduced  the  term,  the  relevant  concept  is  impossible  to  define  “with  absolute 
precision” (1951, pp. 119-124). The meaning of an open textured concept is somehow 
always open to revision; no specification of its meaning can be taken to be exhaustive. To 
hold that some metaphors are unparaphrasable is not to deny that they can communicate 
true claims, but rather to deny that the true claims they communicate can be stated in 
language that is itself literally true.
For the purposes of the present investigation, I am interested only in determining 
whether a fictional scientific model, understood as a metaphor, is translatable into some 
literal  description (paraphrasable)  in  principle or  not  translatable  into  some  literal 
description  (unparaphrasable)  in  principle.  For  other  purposes,  someone  might  be 
interested in determining whether a particular agent offering the model in a particular 
instance is actually able to produce a literal paraphrase. However, I am not interested in 
exploring the sense of paraphrasability that has to do with the current epistemic status of 
the agent providing the metaphor. I am interested in whether there is a literal paraphrase 
that fully captures the meaning of the metaphor in question. Someone offering a model 
may not know whether it is paraphrasable in principle. But I assume there is a fact of the 
matter. It would be a mistake to think that whether a model explains is determined by 
whether a particular agent is in a position to relay the entire content of the model. So an 
account of how fictional models might be explanatory should not hinge on features of an 
agent's epistemic status such as whether she is able to produce a paraphrase of the model. 
It might be reasonable to think that whether a particular agent has been successful in 
performing the speech act of explaining some phenomenon depends on some features of 
the agent's epistemic status, but the present investigation does not seek to evaluate the 
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success of such speech acts. I am interested in whether the fictional models  themselves 
can be explanatory. 
Thus,  I will proceed with the assumption that a fictional model must be either 
paraphrasable  in  principle or  unparaphrasable  in  principle.  I  will  use  the  terms 
“paraphrasable” and “unparaphrasable” only to refer to paraphrasability in principle and 
unparaphrasability in principle, respectively. 
I propose that fictional models, understood as metaphors, must be paraphrasable 
in order to be scientifically explanatory. As I will illustrate in section 6, it is, at the very 
least, clear that the cases of fictional models I considered in Part I are paraphrasable. 
Conceivably,  one  might  hold  the  view that  fictional  models  are  genuine  explanatory 
fictions, but are unparaphrasable metaphors. This would require a commitment both to 
the  view  that  some  metaphors  can  be  truly  unparaphrasable  and  to  the  view  that 
unparaphrasable  metaphors  can  be  explanatory.  To  use  one  of  the  models  under 
consideration as an example, you might hold that “short-term memory is a pushdown 
stack” is relevantly like “Juliet is the sun” in that there is some richness of the metaphor 
that  cannot  be  conveyed  non-metaphorically.  Such  an  account  would  attribute  some 
mysterious character to fictional models (of the sort that might motivate a rejection of 
premise (3) in the paradox above), but such an account strikes me as mistaken, simply on 
the  grounds  that  I  see  no  difficulty,  at  least  for  the  examples  I  have  considered,  in 
drawing  out  the  content  of  the  models  in  non-metaphorical  language.  Without  any 
evidence to the contrary, I will take for granted that unparaphrasable metaphors, if there 
are any, are not the sort that could constitute scientific explanations. 
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C. Understanding Fictional Scientific Models as Metaphors
If the right way to understand fictional scientific models is to understand them as 
paraphrasable metaphors,  as  I  have proposed,  this  requires that everything the model 
conveys in terms of the secondary subject can be stated in terms of the primary subject. 
In other words, we can, at least in principle, give a literal, non-metaphorical paraphrase of 
the model's content about the primary subject. A scientific model's being paraphrasable 
means  that  it  is  possible  to  communicate  all  the  claims the  model  makes  about  the 
primary subject without including any non-SAI falsehoods. This is a critical assumption 
on which my account relies. Though the model itself does include falsehoods, the model's 
real content and the paraphrase of the metaphor, contain no falsehoods (in a successful 
explanatory case). Paraphrasability is the feature by which metaphors function to convey 
truths  while  being  literally  false.  Applying  the  concept  to  fictional  scientific  models 
reveals how they can be explanatory. 
It is worth noting that one important detail about my view will not be completely 
filled in at present. As I noted above, the paraphrase of an explanatory fictional model 
will  include only true claims about  features of the primary subject.  I  take it  that the 
model's content is enhanced by background information that indicates which features of 
the secondary subject are put forth as analogous to features of the primary subject and 
which features are falsely attributed to the primary subject by the model. It would be an 
implausible  result  if  all  of  the features  of the secondary subject  that  happened to be 
analogous to features of the primary subject, even if the author of the model had no idea 
that  such  an  analogy  obtained,  ended  up  as  part  of  the  paraphrase,  as  part  of  the 
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explanatory content of the model. I take it as most plausible that the matter of which 
features  are  highlighted  as  analogous  in  an  explanatory  fictional  model  will  be 
determined by contextually relevant background information (which is included in the 
content of the model). As I mentioned above, I do not have in mind a full account of how 
background knowledge plays this role, though I acknowledge that a complete defense of 
my view would ultimately require such an account. For present purposes, it suffices to 
say that the relevant background knowledge makes up part of the model's content, though 
not part of the model itself.  
An assumption underlying my account is that the model, the content of the model, 
and the paraphrase of the model are all propositional. That is, they can be fully articulated 
in terms of true and false claims. The model is comprised of claims about the secondary 
subject (e.g. “a pushdown stack orders items serially”) and claims that serve to attribute 
the properties of the secondary subject to the primary subject (e.g. “short-term memory is 
a pushdown stack” and  the property attributions this statement entails when combined 
with  the  model's  description  of  a  pushdown  stack).  The  model's  content  is  more 
expansive than the model itself. It includes a description of all the claims in the model, 
the contextually-relevant background information (noted above) that indicates which of 
the model's claims are false, and the claim that all of the remaining claims made by the 
model  (i.e.  those  that  are  not  deemed  false  by  the  contextually-relevant  background 
information) are true.18 The paraphrase contains only the parts of the model's content that 
18 Within the model's content, the description of the model's claims includes both its claims attributing  
properties to the primary subject and its claims attributing properties to the secondary subject. As I  
noted in footnote 13, it is unlikely in a successful explanatory case that any of the model's claims  
about the secondary subject will be false. If they turn out to be, however, this would not be a problem 
for the account. Presumably, the contextually-relevant background information in the model's content 
would indicate that they are false.
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are true claims about  the primary subject.  The paraphrase is  the model's  explanatory 
content. 
Applying  my  account  of  how  fictional  models  function  as  paraphrasable 
metaphors  to  the  pushdown  stack  model,  the  reason  that  the  false  depiction  of  the 
relations as spatial  in the secondary subject does not impugn the model's explanatory 
capacity is that the false claim (when augmented with relevant background knowledge) 
entail true claims, which end up in the paraphrase. The model makes false claims the 
relations are spatial in order to convey true claims about the actual relations that obtain 
among memories. Of course, the claim that memories bear spatial relations to one another  
is  not  among the  model's  true  claims.  Rather,  we  think  recall  relations  consist  of  a 
temporally based order,  in which a subject's  memories of the most recently presented 
stimuli are more likely to be forgotten than a subject's memories of stimuli that were 
presented  less  recently.  In  a  physical  pushdown  stack  (the  secondary  subject  of  the 
metaphor),  the relations we are interested in highlighting by employing the metaphor 
(last-in-first-out structure, serial quality, etc.) obtain because of the spatial arrangement of 
items in a stack. The serial quality of the recall relations we think obtain among short-
term memories does, necessarily, obtain among the items in the physical pushdown stack 
employed to represent  them.  In  other  words,  claims about  the  serial  recall  relations 
scientists  actually  attribute  to  memories  when  employing  this  model  are entailed  by  
claims  about  the  spatial  relations  of  the  items  in  the  physical  stack,  along  with 
background  knowledge,  included  in  the  content  of  the  model,  indicating  that  certain 
features  of  the  secondary  subject  (including,  in  this  case,  the  serial  structure  of  the 
physical stack) are not true of the primary subject. Claims about spatial relations do not 
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make it into the paraphrase, but claims about the structure of the serial recall relations 
that  they  entail  does.  Thus,  the  model  entails  literally  true  claims  without  being 
comprised of literally true claims itself.
To put the point  another way, the falsehoods in these fictional models are not 
preserved, in any sense, in the literal paraphrase; only the true claims about the primary 
subject  that  are  entailed by the  fictional  model  have  a  place  in  the  paraphrase.  The 
pushdown  stack  metaphor  depicts  the  relations  among  items  presented  to  someone's 
memory (serial memory recall relations) as spatial relations. The model depicts items in 
the physical stack as being located beneath or on top of other items in the stack. It would 
be a mistaken interpretation to think that the scientists who put forth this model of short-
term memory consider the relations between actual memories to be spatial. They clearly 
see memories as being serially accessible, but not in virtue of the spatial relations one 
memory bears to another.  The attribution of serial accessibility to short-term memory 
makes it into the paraphrase (the model's explanatory content about the primary subject), 
but the attribution of spatial structure to short-term memory does not. The process of 
paraphrasing filters out all the falsehoods. Critically, the falsehoods, as such, are neither 
in the model's content nor in the paraphrase. And, as I will argue in section 5, for this 
reason, we can see they are not doing any of the explaining. They are not part of the 
literal paraphrase of the model, and thus not part of the explanatory content of the model 
(the truths about the primary subject in the paraphrase that are explanatory).
D. How Fictional Scientific Models Explain as Metaphors
What  makes  a  fictional  model  explanatorily  successful  is  that  the  model  has 
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specifically identifiable, paraphrasable entailments that are literally true and that answer 
the  relevant  “why?”  questions  about  the  target  system.  If  the  model  constitutes  a 
successful scientific explanation, the paraphrase must be suited to explain the phenomena 
in question. The reason that these false models can explain is not that their falsehoods are 
somehow transformed into truths or that their claims are somehow both true and false.  
Rather, as I noted above, it is that they actually entail the truths that do the explaining. 
One way  to  understand what  I  am suggesting  about  how the  fictional  model 
entails its paraphrase is to understand the paraphrase as something like a collection of 
Ramsey sentences. Ramsey sentences were introduced originally by Frank Ramsey and 
later employed by Rudolf Carnap as a tool to identify a sense in which a theory that 
posits  unobservables  can be  accepted as  true  and explanatory without  committing its 
subscribers to accepting the existence of the unobservables posited.19 Rather than saying, 
as theories positing unobservables do before being stated in Ramsey sentences, that there 
exist unobservable entities with various qualities, a Ramsey sentence says that there exist 
some things (we know not what) that bear relations corresponding to the relations of the 
unobservable entities posited by the theory. The upshot of this, for an anti-realist, is that 
all of the scientifically useful content of the theory is contained by the corresponding 
Ramsey  sentence.  This  allows  for  a  respect  in  which  one  can  remain  noncommittal 
regarding the unobservable posits of a theory without this undermining one's acceptance 
of  the  theory  as  an  explanation  of  observed  phenomena.  The  Ramsey sentence  thus 
conveys structural information about the relations obtaining among the entities without 
19 For a clear discussion of Ramsey sentences and their role in the realism versus anti-realism debate,  
see Psillos (1999, pp. 40-69). For their original description, see Ramsey (1929).
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identifying the entities. I want to suggest that, in a similar respect, the paraphrase of a 
fictional  model  contains  only  some  of  the  content  from  the  original  metaphor,  but 
captures all of the explanatory capacity of the model. 
The pushdown stack model literally says that each memory has a place in the 
stack,  either  above  or  below some other  memory.  Thus,  it  literally  attributes  a  false 
property to memories. The paraphrase of the model (understood as something relevantly 
like a Ramsey sentence) might say that there is some relation such that each memory 
bears that relation to other memories and identify some structural features of the relation 
without identifying exactly what the relation is. After all, it would be strange to think that 
the  pushdown stack  model,  properly  understood,  entails  an  account  of  just  what  the 
relations are that obtain among memories, given that there is no such widely accepted 
account among scientists. Similar references by the model to “something we know not 
what with some identifiable features” are present in each of the cases I have examined. 
Both  Ramsey  sentences  and  the  account  of  paraphrases  I  am  offering  preserve  this 
character.  
Importantly,  I do not mean to suggest that paraphrases of fictional models  are 
comprised  of  Ramsey  sentences.  There  are  constraints  on  Ramsey  sentences  –  for 
instance, that they omit all posits of unobservables – that I see no reason to think must be  
placed on paraphrases of fictional models. Rather, I mean to suggest that considering 
paraphrases as analogous to Ramsey sentences helps highlight features of the relationship 
I take to obtain between a fictional model and its paraphrase. Just as a Ramsey sentence 
is an entailment of a theory that is weaker than the theory, a paraphrase follows from the  
metaphorical  model's  content  and  is  weaker  than  the  metaphorical  model's  content. 
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Moreover,  just  as  Ramsey  sentences  entail  all  the  empirical  consequences  of  their 
corresponding theories, paraphrases of metaphorical models entail all of the explanatory 
content of the metaphorical model. My intention has been to draw out these features of 
my account by way of an analogy to Ramsey sentences – a more familiar philosophical 
tool. I will now show how applying my account resolves the paradox introduced above 
without making any significant conceptual sacrifices. 
5. Fictional Models as Metaphors: Implications for Explanatory Capacity
Once  we  have  identified  these  fictional  scientific  models  as  paraphrasable 
metaphors, there are two straightforward lessons to be drawn regarding their explanatory 
capacity. I will develop these two ways of describing how fictional models can furnish 
scientific explanations, (L1) and (L2), in this section. These lessons are different ways of 
capturing  the  account  I  developed  above  (according  to  which  explanatory  fictional 
models are  paraphrasable metaphors),  so there is  no real  difference  between them in 
terms  of  the  accuracy  with  which  they  depict  the  phenomenon  of  fictional  models 
furnishing explanations. They differ only in their prescriptions for how we ought to apply 
the  relevant  terminology to  describe  fictional  models  in  light  of  the  analysis  I  have 
offered and in the prescriptions they offer for how to resolve the paradox of explanatory 
fictional models. 
Given that  the  two lessons  lend themselves  to  different  regimentations  of  the 
relevant  vocabulary,  terminological  preferences  and  pragmatic  aims  will  determine 
whether one or the other provide a better framework for understanding the explanatory 
capacity of fictional models. At present, I do not see a decisive reason to prefer one over 
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the other, though there may be such reasons, either in general or in specific contexts. The 
crucial point is that to accept either (L1) or (L2) as correct is to accept that there is no  
mysterious respect in which falsehoods are explanatory. As long as at least one of these 
two ways of stating the verdict of my account suffices to accurately characterize the role 
fictional models play in scientific explanation, my account resolves the paradox. 
A. Lesson One: The paraphrase, not the literally false model, really explains.
(L1)  Because  we  have  identified  fictional  models  as  paraphrasable 
metaphors,  we can see that  it  is  really  the paraphrase  that  is  doing the 
explanatory work. So these are not cases of genuine scientific explanation 
by false models.
Those who defend the claim that scientific fictions can be explanatory do not, of 
course, think that the fictional models themselves are true, but they do seem to think that 
the fictions  get at something true. As Bokulich frequently puts it, we take only those 
fictional  models  to  be  explanatory  that   generate  “genuine  insight”  or  “genuine 
knowledge” (2008,  2009,  2011,  2012).  Thus,  even those  who insist  that  the fictional 
models qua fictions are explanatory seem to be committed to thinking that the thing the 
models “get at” has to be a truth for the explanation to be successful.  If we understand 
fictional models as metaphors, what has to be true is the description they provide of the 
primary subject. And if we understand them as paraphrasable metaphors, we see that this 
description of the primary subject is not inexorably bound up in falsehoods. There is a 
literal  paraphrase  that  is  doing  the  real  explaining.  And  that  description  in  literal 
language, the paraphrase, is one for which we can evaluate explanatory success in all of 
the standard ways (e.g. by asking whether it provides causal information, is unifying, 
43
answers the right contrastive “why?” questions, and so forth). 
According (L1), it is not really the fiction itself that is doing the explaining. The 
fiction is adverting to the real explainer in some way (as I have suggested, by being part 
of the model that entails it). The false descriptions might be good enough (or even better)  
for  various  pragmatic  purposes,  but  really  the  falsehoods explain  only  by  conveying 
literal truths about the target system that do the real explaining. The real explainer, the 
paraphrase, is not fictional, so these cases do not appear to be genuine cases of scientific 
explanation by fictions. 
Applying (L1), we could reject either premise (1) or (2) of the paradox identified 
in  section 2,  depending on how we choose to  define the key terms. We could reject 
premise (1) (which says that the fictional models are false) if we interpreted it as saying 
that the model's content is false. After all, all of the claims in the model's content turn out  
to  be  true  when fictional  models  are  rightly  understood  as  paraphrasable  metaphors. 
However, if we choose to read premise (1) as saying that the fictional models themselves 
are literally false, we ought not abandon it. We could instead reject premise (2) (which 
says that the fictional models explain) if we understood it as saying that the literally false 
model, not the model's content or the paraphrase, is doing the explaining. If we preferred 
to read premise (2) as saying that the fictional model conveyed explanatory content, then 
we ought not reject it. If you read both (1) and (2) in the ways that are incompatible with 
(L1), you would reject both (1) and (2) in applying (L1). Whichever of these options you 
choose, applying (L1) appears to dissolve the paradox. 
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B. Lesson Two: Only the true parts of fictional models explain.
Now I will consider a second way of answering the question of whether fictional 
models  can  explain,  given  my  claim  that  they  are  best  understood  as  paraphrasable 
metaphors:
(L2) Fictional models can genuinely explain, in virtue of the fact that part 
of the content they convey can explain (namely, the true claims about the 
primary subject that comprise the paraphrase). However, their explanatory 
success is derivative from the explanatory success of the paraphrase. 
(L2) is meant to capture the intuition that there is some sense in which it is correct to say 
that  fictional  models  are explaining  because  they  communicate  the  paraphrase.  It 
therefore offers another option for regimenting the application of term “explanatory” with 
respect to these models. Whereas (L1) says these models do not explain because their 
only  role  in  the  explanatory  enterprise  is  to  communicate  content  that  entails  the 
paraphrase (which does the explaining); (L2), by contrast, says that communicating the 
explanatory paraphrase counts as explaining. True, (L2) must allow, these models derive 
their explanatory success from the explanatory success of the paraphrase, but that does 
not mean it would be false to say these fictional models are explanatory. 
(L2) tells us that, though it may be correct to apply the term “explanatory” to the 
fictional model rather than exclusively to the paraphrase, we should not see this as a case 
of explanation by falsehood. According to my account, the false claims in the model do 
not themselves end up being part of the explanation the model furnishes. For instance, if 
we  thought  the  false  claim  that  short-term  memory  has  a  finite  capacity  explained 
something about short-term memory, it  seems we would have to think that  there was 
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some relevant “why” question to which those who subscribe to the model take the finite 
capacity of the stack to provide an answer. But this is not one of the explanatory uses to 
which the model is put. Rather, the model is put forward to answer questions such as 
“why did the subject forget the piece of information most recently presented to her rather 
than the piece of information presented to her a longer time ago?”. The true claim that 
short-term memory has a last-in-first-out structure, which is part of the paraphrase, does 
provide an answer to the relevant “why?” questions, the questions for which the model is 
put forth to provide an answer. Only the true claims in the model's content are explaining. 
 If it were really the case that the false claims in fictional models are explanatory 
as falsehoods (as, for instance, Bokulich appears to think), we would expect to see this 
happening in at least one of the cases of fictional models I considered in part I. But as I 
will show in section 6, applying my account to the three cases reveals this not to be the 
result. In all three of the fictional models under consideration, the true claims that end up 
in the paraphrases do all of the explanatory work. The false claims in the models do not 
themselves  explain,  even  according  to  the  scheme  of  terminological  regimentation 
endorsed by (L2). (L2) permits the application of the term “explanatory” to something 
only part of whose content is explanatory, but it does not follow from (L2) that false 
claims merit this epithet. 
To put  the  conclusion  of  (L2)  simply,  when  we understand what  each of  the 
claims of the metaphorical model contributes explanatorily, we see that the explanation 
and the fiction come apart. When genuine explanation is given by a fictional model, it is 
not being given by the false claims in the model, the claims that make the model fictional.  
The claims attributing false features to the target system are genuinely fictional (they are 
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false without being one of SAI),  but they are not genuinely explanatory.  Each of the 
model's claims is either explanatory, but not fictional or fictional, but not explanatory.
How does (L2) apply to the paradox introduced in section 2? You might reject 
premise (1) (which said that the fictional models were false) if you thought that it entailed  
that they were false through and though, so to speak. In other words, you might abandon 
premise (1) in light of (L2) if you thought that the inclusion of some falsehoods in the 
model  did  not  justify  deeming the  entire  thing “false.”  Perhaps  a  revised  version  of 
premise (1) informed by (L2) would say simply “the models have false parts.” Likewise, 
applying (L2) to premise (2) (which stated that the fictional models are explanatory), you 
might reject this premise if  you thought  it  entailed that every part  of the model was 
explanatory.  In  other  words,  you might  abandon premise  (2)  in  light  of  (L2)  if  you 
thought that all parts of the model had to be explanatory in order for the model to be 
correctly  considered  explanatory.  A revised  version  of  premise  (2)  informed by (L2) 
might say “fictional models have explanatory parts.” Accepting such a revised versions of  
premises (1) or (2) eliminates the contradiction with (3) that gives rise to the the paradox.  
Here again, you might also resolve the paradox by rejecting both (1) and (2) in favor of 
these revisions. 
C. Conclusions from (L1) and (L2)
For  present  purposes,  as  I  mentioned  above,  I  want  to  remain  agnostic  with 
respect to whether (L1) is the best way to understand what is going on in fictional models 
or  whether  (L2)  is.  While  the  two lessons  will  be  equally  viable  for  many cases  of 
fictional models, in some cases, it may be more natural to apply one than the other. This 
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sort of consideration may weigh in favor of one regimentation of the relevant vocabulary 
over another. I will not explore this in any depth in the present investigation, but I leave 
open both the possibility that one lesson may turn out to be terminologically preferable 
and the possibility that the ease with which the lessons accommodate cases of interest 
may turn out to rule decisively in favor of one of the two. 
These lessons appear to exhaust the plausible options for making sense of the 
explanatory capacity of fictional models if we understand metaphors as paraphrasable 
metaphors, as I have argued we should. By adopting either, the paradox dissolves. Thus, 
if  the  fictional  models  I  have  considered  are  accurately  described  as  paraphrasable 
metaphors,  and  if  other  fictional  models  are  accurately  described  as  paraphrasable 
metaphors, these models do not seem to present us with a genuine explanatory paradox. 
In both cases, there is a respect in which the model explains, and that respect is not the 
same respect in which the model is fictional. 
Finally, I want to guard against a possible misreading of my account that these 
lessons might call to mind. I do not mean to suggest that, if you simply removed all the 
falsehoods from the model, you would be left with an explanation of the phenomenon in 
question. When I say that only the true parts of the model are explaining, I do not mean to 
say that the true parts of the model that are explanatory, all by themselves, constitute a  
complete explanation, but rather that they convey  explanatory information.20 That is to 
say,  the  paraphrase  of  a  successful  explanatory  fictional  model  fills  in  some  of  the 
information that would be included in a complete explanation of the phenomenon and, in 
20 The distinction between explanatory information and a complete assemblage of all the information  
that would feature in an ideal explanation (an ideal explanatory text) is defended by Peter Railton 
(1981).
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doing  so,  answer  some  of  the  relevant  “why?”  questions  about  the  phenomenon's 
occurrence.  The matter of determining how much explanatory information it  takes to 
provide an explanation is notoriously fraught.21 I will not attempt to answer this question; 
however,  I  take it  that  the  true  claims about  the  primary  subject  that  end  up in  the  
paraphrases  of  explanatory  fictional  models  provide  at  least  explanatory  information 
(they  may  or  may  not  provide  enough  of  this  explanatory  information  to  count  as 
explanations  on  their  own).  This  is  what  makes  it  accurate  to  apply  the  term 
“explanatory,” either to the paraphrases of the models only (in accordance with (L1)) or 
to the models themselves as well as the paraphrases (in accordance with (L2)). 
6. Final Analysis of the Cases
I noted in section 4 that all  the fictional models I examined in Part  I are best 
understood as paraphrasable metaphors. In this section, I will describe how my account 
applies to these cases in more detail. In illustrating my account, I have already explained 
how it  handles  the  pushdown stack  model  for  short-term memory,  so  it  will  not  be 
necessary to discuss it further. I will now turn to the other two models I considered in Part 
I  and  describe  how  my  account  handles  the  electron  orbitals  model  of  valence  and 
Maxwell's mechanistic model of the electromagnetic field.
A. Electron Orbitals Model: Explaining valence
21 Peter Railton, for instance, argues that a complete explanation, one that identifies all the information 
relevant to the occurrence of a phenomenon (which he calls an ideal explanatory text) is unattainable 
(1981, p. 239-41). 
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For various pragmatic purposes, when scientists offer the fictional orbitals model, 
they  communicate  truths  about  the  target  system  through  falsehoods,  describing  it 
literally as a system in which particles have valences in virtue of having, say, one extra 
electron  or  one  fewer  electron  in  a  determinate  spatial  region  (in  an  orbital).  This 
falsehood makes the model fictional, but it falls away in the paraphrase. Moreover, the 
model says that an orbital can accommodate a certain number of electrons, and (among 
other  things)  that  chemical  reactions  happen  on  the  basis  of  particles  having 
complementary numbers of electrons  in  these determinate spatial  locations.  However, 
applying  tools  from  my  account,  we  can  say  that  this  literally  false  model,  when 
augmented  with  the  relevant  background knowledge  included in  the  model's  content, 
entails the true claim that there is some physical state or other in virtue of which particles 
with a certain number of electrons are attracted to particles with complementary numbers 
of electrons, and so on. This state may be specifiable in terms of wavefunctions, or it may 
not be, according to the paraphrase of the model. The paraphrase does not include the 
claim that orbitals are actually wave functions. Rather than specifying precisely what the 
property is, it indicates that there is such property that plays the identified roles. In this 
way, it bears many similarities to a Ramsey sentence. 
In contexts for which the model is presented as a genuine fiction, we acknowledge 
that it is not in fact true that electrons have determinate spatial locations. This is one of 
the falsehoods that falls away, that does not make its way into the literal paraphrase of the 
model. Only truths remain in the paraphrase, and these truths can furnish an explanation 
of valence. The paraphrase conveys explanatory information because it identifies some 
constraints on what the property may be, the claims about those constraints are both true 
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and answers to relevant “why?” questions. 
I take it as a virtue of my account that it portrays the fictional orbitals model as 
being  fairly  non-committal  about  the  actual  underlying  structure  of  the  quantum 
phenomena. Indeed, the right way to understand this model appears to be that it is making 
the fairly modest claim that there is some relation (we do not know exactly how it is 
realized) that has the basic structure conveyed by the fictional orbitals model. The model 
functions to convey true claims about the general structure underlying valence, and it is 
worth noting that, even if it turns out that the quantum mechanical picture of electrons is 
later found out to be false, this would not challenge the truth of the paraphrase of the 
fictional  orbitals  model.  It  is  consistent  with  the  fictional  orbitals  model  of  valence, 
properly understood as a metaphor, that the full explanation involves probabilistic wave 
functions.  But  the  fictional  model  may also  be  consistent  with  other  accounts  of  the 
underlying property. Given that this model was employed before orbitals were understood 
as wavefunctions, it would be a strange result if my analysis implied that the model was 
committed to identifying orbitals as wavefunctions. 
Of course, the model's paraphrase is a literally true depiction of the target system 
that turns out to be compatible with the claims of quantum mechanics. So we do not need 
to  worry  that  the  actual  meaning  of  the  model  is  really inconsistent  with  quantum 
mechanics. When we see what the model actually says about the primary subject – when 
we attend to its paraphrase, which contains only true entailments of the model's content 
about  the  primary  subject  –  we  see  that  the  orbitals  model  (when  it  is  presented 
fictionally) is perfectly compatible with the claims of most standard interpretations of 
quantum mechanics regarding the properties of electrons. Moreover, the paraphrase of the 
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model is compatible both with standard interpretations of quantum mechanics that deny 
that electrons have determinate spatial  locations and with non-standard interpretations 
that attribute to electrons determinate spatial locations. 
Applying (L1) to this model, we would conclude that the false model itself is not 
explanatory  because  the  paraphrase  that  it  communicates  is  doing  the  explaining. 
Applying (L2) to this model, we would conclude that it  fine to say that the model is  
explanatory, given that it functions to communicate the explanatory paraphrase. 
B. Maxwell's  Mechanistic Model of the Electromagnetic Field: Explaining a 
Possibility
One way to understand the explanatory aims of Maxwell's mechanistic model of 
the electromagnetic field is to understand it as a model that seeks to establish that some 
phenomenon  is  possible.  On  this  way  of  understanding  the  model,  it  is importantly 
different from the other two fictional models I have considered. The target explanandum 
is not an actual empirical phenomenon, but rather a modal claim. The explanandum is not 
the  actual  existence  of  the  electromagnetic  field;  it  is  the  possibility  that  an 
electromagnetic field,  understood with certain constraints,  exists.  However different it 
may be from the pushdown stack model and the orbitals model, it does seem to qualify as 
a fictional model according to the criteria I provided in Part I. So ideally, my account will  
also  be  able  to  make sense  of  how this  model  can be  explanatory in  spite  of  being 
fictional. As I will show, my account can indeed account for the explanatory capacity of 
Maxwell's model. 
Before I apply my account to this case, however, it is worth considering some of 
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the concerns one might have about classifying this case as I intend to.  One reason you 
might doubt the Maxwell case's eligibility to be classified as a paraphrasable metaphor, or  
even as  a  fictional  model  in  the  first  place,  is  that  you might  doubt  that  it  actually 
contains falsehoods. A tempting reading is to say that each of the claims in the model is 
somehow modally presented from the outset. You might think that the model's content 
about the mechanisms it describes (what I have identified as content about the secondary 
subject) is not “here is a gear, here is an idle wheel, etc.” but rather, “it is possible that 
there is a gear here, it is possible that there is an idle wheel here, etc.” If this is the right  
way to think of the model's content, it  really does not seem like a  metaphor. It  is a  
collection of true modal claims.
To this  worry,  I  respond that  this  is not  how the  model  is  actually  presented; 
however, if it had been presented in these terms, it would not be a fictional model of the 
sort my account is meant to encompass. When Maxwell gives the model, he does not 
make it clear that its constitutive claims are somehow inherently modal. Rather, he offers 
a  description  of  how  parts  in  a  mechanistic  system  fit  together.  This  description  is 
literally false.  But the false description can still  furnish an explanation of something, 
something  that  happens  to  be  modal,  namely  that  a  field  with  certain  properties  is 
possible.  This model,  not  presented in  modal terms, explains  the modal truth that an 
electromagnetic field is possible. There is some room for interpretation in this case, due 
to  the  fact  that  Maxwell  was  not  explicit  about  what  he  actually  had in  mind when 
presenting  this  model.  As  Thomas  Simpson  noted  in  his  commentary  on  Maxwell's 
model, “the reader must be the judge” of what Maxwell took the ontological status of the 
model's  components  to  be  (1997,  p.  40  ).  However,  if  one  accepts  the  interpretive 
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consensus, it appears this is a case of a genuinely fictional model. As I noted above, if the 
aforementioned reading (in which each of the model's claims is a modal claim) turns out 
to be the right one, it would rule out the model's classification as fictional, and this would 
be no problem for my analysis.
Another  reason  one  might  think  that  the  Maxwell  case  resists  analysis  as  a 
paraphrasable metaphor becomes clear once I apply my analysis. Part of what ends up in 
the paraphrase of this model's content is “at least one configuration of a field with such-
and-such properties that does not violate the laws of physics is possible.” If you think that 
the paraphrase contains only this claim, this presents a major difference between this case 
and the others I have considered. Namely, in the Maxwell model, the paraphrase does not 
look like an explanans as much as an explanandum. You might still think there is a sense 
(however trivial) in which “at least one instance of x is possible” explains “x is possible,” 
and so my account still succeeds in depicting what is going on here accurately. The model  
is literally false. The model entails the paraphrase and the falsehoods fall away in the 
paraphrase.  The  paraphrase  is  true,  and  the  paraphrase  explains  what  we  set  out  to 
explain, the modal claim. So even though it looks like the Maxwell case is fundamentally 
different form the other two, on this reading, my account handles it just as well. I take 
this to be a virtue of my account. 
If the only claim that seems to make its way into the paraphrase of the model is 
that an electromagnetic field that is consistent with the laws of physics is possible, one 
worry might be that (L2) applies awkwardly or does not apply to this case, given that 
there are no true claims to identify at the level of the unparaphrased metaphor. My reply 
to this general worry is that, as I noted in section 5, there are some cases for which one of 
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the two lessons I provided for resolving the paradox of explanatory fictions fits more 
naturally than the other. I take this to be true of the Maxwell case. (L1) seems to fit the 
case quite well,  whereas (L2) seems to fit  less naturally. Applying (L1), the Maxwell 
model would not come out as a case of genuine scientific explanation by a false model. 
The paraphrase of the model (whose content is exhausted by “such and such a field is 
possible”) is true and it is the paraphrase that is doing the explaining. The paraphrase is 
the explanatory information, and the model literally entails it. Thus, it really is only the 
paraphrase that is doing the explaining. The mechanical elements of the model play no 
part in the actual explaining, apart from having entailed the explainer. 
However, in addition to the claim identified above as the paraphrase of Maxwell's 
model (“at least one configuration of a field with such-and-such properties that does not 
violate the laws of physics is possible.”), one might think that further information must 
end up in the paraphrase for my account to accurately capture the meaning of the model. 
To think this  would be to resist  a  paraphrase  in  which none of the claims about  the 
structural features depicted in the model – claims about the gears and idle wheels, etc. – 
entail claims in the paraphrase that attribute properties to the target system. One might 
think that the paraphrase of the model will include claims that there are properties in any 
possible system of the sort identified by the model that play roles analogous to the roles 
played by the mechanistic elements (e.g. idle wheels and gears) depicted in the model.  
Adopting this much richer understanding of what is included in the paraphrase might be 
better suited for an alternative way of understanding the explanatory aims of Maxwell's 
model that I have not mentioned up to this point. It may be more accurate to see the 
explanatory  aim  of  Maxwell's  model  as  being  to  establish  that  a  certain  sort  of 
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explanation for some phenomenon is possible. If this is the correct way to understand 
Maxwell's model, perhaps the paraphrase of the model ought to include a series of claims 
that constitute such an explanation rather than merely the claim that the phenomenon is 
possible. Thus, additional claims, such as claims about properties that are analogous to 
the mechanistic elements, might end up in the paraphrase. 
On this reading, both (L1) and (L2) appear to apply naturally. Applying (L1), of 
course,  would  be  to  say  that  the  model  does  not  explain  that  a  particular  sort  of 
explanation is possible, but its paraphrase does. Applying (L2) would yield the verdict 
that the model as a whole does explain that a particular sort of explanation is possible, 
though  this  explanatory  success  is  derived  from  the  explanatory  success  of  the 
paraphrase. For the paraphrase to convey successful explanatory information in this case 
would be to communicate some constraints (e.g. claims about the existence of properties 
that play certain roles in the possible system) on an explanation and also to communicate 
that such an explanation is possible. Applying either lessons seems to make sense of how 
the model functions to communicate the possibility of a certain sort of explanation, and 
so I conclude that my account also fits the Maxwell model on this understanding of its 
explanatory aims. 
It is worth noting that various dimensions of ambiguity in the Maxwell  model 
make it difficult to see whether any of my attempts at applying my account to this case 
accurately capture its explanatory aims. However, I take it as a virtue of my account that 
it can answer, at least in a general way, all of the possibilities for how to best understand 
the model that I have considered thus far. 
Given that my account applies to all three of the cases I considered in Part I, I 
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conclude that a significant virtue of my account is that I can give an analysis of fictional 
models'  explanatory capacities without giving up on (3) from the paradox above, the 
claim that  that only truths can be explanatory. 
7. Conclusion
In Part I of this paper, I sought to show that there really are cases of scientific 
models  that  are  genuinely  fictional  and  also  genuinely  explanatory.  To  this  end,  I 
considered  the  sorts  of  falsehoods  accepted  as  inevitabilities  in  scientific  modeling 
(simplifications, approximations, and idealizations) and contrasted them with the sorts of 
falsehoods that scientific practice appears to permit in this special class of models. I took 
the result  that falsehoods other than simplifications,  approximations, and idealizations 
appear to be accepted as parts of some scientific models that are put forth to provide 
explanations to be a truly puzzling phenomenon in scientific practice that called for some 
account. The paradox of explanatory fictional models that I introduced at the start of Part 
II illustrated just what is so puzzling about these cases and why some analysis is needed 
to resolve the apparent contradiction in their acceptance by the scientific community. 
In Part II, I offered a positive account of how we should understand the function 
of fictional models. Specifically, I argued, we should see them as a class of metaphors, a 
widely accepted semantic phenomenon in which literal falsehoods convey truths. I do 
not, of course, take my account to have shed any light on the extant puzzles concerning 
the semantic function of metaphors. The general puzzles that exist for the idea that a 
metaphor can convey a truth in spite of being literally false are puzzles for my account as 
well. However, I take it that the ubiquitous employment of metaphors in our language to 
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this  end  of  communicating  truth  through  falsehood  is  evidence  that  they  do  in  fact 
accomplish this task, however the specific details ought to be filled in. Insofar as this is 
accepted, the account I have offered, according to which fictional models are metaphors, 
should be accepted as well. 
In the final three sections of part II, I articulated my positive account, provided 
two options for regimenting the relevant vocabulary to describe how fictional models 
furnish  explanations,  showed  that  adopting  my  account  resolves  the  paradox  of 
explanatory fictional models without  making any important conceptual sacrifices,  and 
demonstrated that  the account  successfully accommodates  the three cases  of  fictional 
models I considered in Part I. On the basis of this success, I conclude that understanding 
fictional scientific models as paraphrasable metaphors in the way that I have described is 
not  only a  useful  way to make sense of how they function as explainers,  but  also a 
plausible  account  of why their  presence in  science has  not  given scientists  cause for 
alarm.  These  fictional  models  are  not  any  more  mysterious  than  ordinary  cases  of 
metaphor, and are equally viable means of communicating true information. 
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